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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TERI LIN GODDARD, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
> Case No. 910241 
> Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Issues Presented for Review, Statement of the Case, and 
Facts have all been previously presented. Brief of Appellant at 1-12. Ms. Goddard presents 
this brief in reply to some of the issues raised by the State in its brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relevant to the disposition of this 
appeal are set forth in the text or addenda of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER. 
In her opening brief, Ms. Goddard contended that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction of second degree murder.1 In her opening brief, Ms. Goddard 
marshalled the evidence which supported the verdict. Brief of Appellant at 15-20; State v. 
Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). Ms. Goddard then argued that this evidence was 
insufficient to establish that she possessed the requisite mental state required for the 
commission of second degree murder. 
In response, the State cites the same evidence cited by Ms. Goddard in her opening 
brief. The State's citation to the evidence is in a more condensed form than that presented 
by Ms. Goddard. Further, the State does not acknowledge several instances of conflicting 
testimony from the same witness. In this sense this case presents an unusual situation. 
Usually a jury (and an appellate court) is free to ignore or disregard conflicting testimony 
from different witnesses. State v. Pierce. 722 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982); State v. Carlsen. 638 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Utah 1981), 
cert denied. 455 U.S. 958. However, this case concerns contradictions within testimony 
from the same witness. Yet, the State relies on such testimony to support the conviction. 
The evidence cited by the State in this case simply does not support the inference that 
Teri Goddard possessed the intent to kill or the intent to cause serious bodily injury which 
was required by the trial court in this case. For example, the State cites the testimony of 
Christine Grogan, a neighbor of Ms. Goddard's, regarding an incident which she witnessed 
to infer that "defendant was angry enough with someone to make a death threat." However, 
*In 1991, the legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 to remove references to 
"second degree murder" and substituted references to "murder." However, because Ms. 
Goddard was tried and convicted under the prior statute and because the caselaw relied on in 
this brief was decided under the prior statute, the nomenclature "second degree murder" will 
be used in this brief. 
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the State ignores Ms. Grogan's testimony to the effect that the incident was not unusual to 
her and that, at the time, she "didn't think anything of it." (R. 6 at 90)2 Therefore, the 
"death threat" heard by Ms. Grogan was not sufficiently important for her to bring it to 
anyone's attention on the night in question. Additionally, Ms. Grogan could not testify that 
the "threat" was specifically directed at Derek Hall. 
The State cites the testimony of Frank Gutierrez and states that the jury could infer 
from his testimony that Mr. Hall was in the truck when Christine Grogan heard the 
defendant scream at the truck, that the defendant was attempting to make Derek Hall jealous 
at a party later that evening, and that "there was some sort of ongoing altercation or 
disagreement between defendant and Hall." However, the State ignores that portion of Mr. 
Gutierrez's testimony which indicated that he neither heard nor saw Ms. Goddard during his 
trip with Mr. Hall in the pickup. (R. 176 at 111, 112) Furthermore, the State ignores that 
portion of Mr. Gutierrez's testimony in which he stated that he perceived Ms. Goddard's 
actions at the party not as an attempt to make Derek Hall jealous, but rather as a joke. (R. 
176 at 130) Finally, the State ignores that portion of Mr. Gutierrez's testimony in which he 
stated that Mr. Hall seemed to be feeling good and "he seemed to be happy" during the party 
and calm when he left the party and Gutierrez did not report signs of an altercation between 
Mr. Hall and Ms. Goddard. (R. 176 at 113 - 117) 
The State cites the testimony of Ms. Goddard's neighbor, Beth Steed, who heard loud 
voices coming from the Goddard residence. The State claims that the jury could draw the 
2Citations to the record are the same in this brief as in appellant's opening brief. Brief 
of Appellant at 5-6 n.l. 
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inference from this testimony that Ms. Goddard and Mr. Hall "were arguing or fighting" 
during the early morning hours of June 2. However, the State ignores that portion of Ms. 
Steed's testimony in which she testified that while she was able to identify both a male and 
female voice, she was unable to discern what was being said. (R. 176 at 156) 
Finally, the State cites the testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the forensic 
pathologist, who opined that the wound suffered by Mr. Hall was not consistent with the 
victim's falling forward on the knife "because the knife would deflect out of the hand or 
probably cut the hand of the person holding the knife." (R. 177 at 275) The State's cites 
this testimony for the inference that Ms. Goddard stabbed Mr. Hall. However, the State 
ignores that portion of Dr. Schnittker's testimony in which she testified that holding a 
person's arms could fix the knife sufficiently to cause the wound inflicted upon Mr. Hall if 
Mr. Hall fell on the knife as the defendant testified. (R. 177 at 279-80) Furthermore, the 
State does nothing to reconcile clear inconsistencies in Dr. Schnittker's testimony concerning 
the position of Mr. Hall when the fatal wound was inflicted. Brief of Appellant at 19-20. 
Finally, the State does not mention that even Schnittker conceded that she had "no idea of the 
exact amount of force" used to administer the fatal wound. (R. 177 at 289) 
The State concedes that "the evidence before the jury was contradictory." Brief of 
Appellee at 14. The State fails to disclose that contradictions arose not just between 
witnesses, which it did, but also in each witness's own testimony. To infer that Ms. 
Goddard possessed the requisite mens rea to commit second degree murder, the jury not 
only had to ignore the entire testimony of some witnesses but also had to ignore internal 
inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses which the State now cites to support the 
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conviction. 
In State v. Carlsen. 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981), this Court discussed the standard that 
may be applied when two witnesses give conflicting versions of events. The Court stated: 
The presentation of conflicting evidence does not 
preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, no 
defendant could ever be convicted in a criminal case where 
inconsistent evidence was introduced. In this case, the court, 
acting as the trier of fact in the absence of a jury, was 
authorized to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to 
believe or disbelieve any witness. In electing to believe 
Teeples' version of the facts, the court was aware of the 
criminal standard of proof to be applied. Defendant has shown 
no reason why the court could not have found Teeples' 
testimony to be sufficiently persuasive to dispel any reasonable 
doubt raised by defendant's own conflicting story. 
638 P.2d. at 514-15. A fair inference from Carlsen is that if the defendant is able to 
demonstrate why the trier of fact should discount the prosecution's witnesses, then a 
reasonable doubt has been raised. Because the contradictions in the evidence in this case 
stemmed from internal inconsistencies in witness testimony, a reasonable doubt concerning 
mens rea existed. A trier of fact may choose one witness's testimony over another because 
of credibility issues, but a jury should not be allowed to base a conviction on a portion of a 
fact witness's testimony when the testimony is internally inconsistent. 
To find the defendant guilty in this case, the jury had to find a culpable mental state 
of either intent to kill or intent to inflict serious bodily injury by Ms. Goddard. Nothing in 
the record provides a sufficient basis for the inference of an intent to kill which was a 
prerequisite for a conviction in this case. Rather the jury in this case speculated on the 
defendant's mental state. No evidence cited by the State supports the conclusion that Ms. 
Goddard intended to kill Mr. Hall or inflict serious bodily injury. The conviction was based 
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on mere speculation and therefore must be reversed. 
POINT n 
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE VARIANT OF SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. THE COURT 
ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS, FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT, AND TO ARREST JUDGMENT. 
During trial the defense moved for a dismissal or for a directed verdict based on the 
lack of the requisite mental state to commit the offense charged. (R. 177 at 326-37, R. 178 
at 409, 546) The trial court granted the defense motion to dismiss the depraved indifference 
variant of second degree murder. (R. 178 at 409) Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203(c) (1990) 
In her opening brief, Ms. Goddard argued that based on the trial court's dismissal of the 
depraved indifference variant and the case law from this Court, the motions to dismiss, for a 
directed verdict, or to arrest judgment, should have been granted by the trial court. Ms. 
Goddard argued that this Court has previously held, in State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 
1987) and State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), that the depraved indifference 
variant of second degree murder is necessarily included in either variant a (intentional or 
knowing killing) or variant b (intentional infliction of serious bodily injury) of second degree 
murder. Therefore, Ms. Goddard argued that when the trial court concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to allow the depraved indifference variant to go to the jury, it also 
necessarily concluded that neither of the other two variants which require a greater mens rea 
than the depraved indifference variant were also unsupported by the evidence. When the 
trial court dismissed the depraved indifference variant, it should also have dismissed the 
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other two variants. The court's failure to do so was inconsistent with the case law of this 
jurisdiction. 
The State responds by arguing that the trial court "erred as a matter of law in 
dismissing the depraved indifference variation of second degree murder." Brief of Appellee 
at 15-16. The State then reviews the case law on second degree murder and states that "it 
becomes clear that the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the depraved 
indifference variation." Brief of Appellee at 19. 
A ruling by the trial court on a defendant's motion to dismiss is a determination of 
whether the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that 
the defendant committed the crime in question. State v. Noren. 704 P.2d 568, 570-71 (Utah 
1985). Therefore, such a determination is a factual determination by the trial court regarding 
the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 284 (Utah 1989). A trial 
court's ruling cannot be overturned unless it is found to be clearly erroneous. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 52(b). See, e ^ , Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst. 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 
5,7 (Utah 1993). In this case, the State has made no effort to demonstrate that the trial 
court's ruling on depraved indifference was clearly erroneous. The standard of review for 
factual determinations by a trial court is the applicable standard. 
When a party is assailing a factual finding on appeal, that party must marshal all of 
the evidence which supports the trial court's findings and then demonstrate why, even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the trial court's finding. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); 
Cornish Town v. Koller. 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988). In this case the State has made no 
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effort to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's determination on depraved 
indifference and therefore, the State's argument must be rejected. 
At trial defense counsel asserted that a prima facie showing had not been made that 
the defendant "was an actor acting with knowledge that her act was likely to create this 
grave risk of death." (R. 177 at 336) While no findings were entered by the trial court on 
the motion to dismiss, clearly the trial court must have accepted this argument in ruling on 
the motion to dismiss. However, as pointed out in appellant's opening brief, this Court has 
stated that depraved indifference is necessarily included in variants a (intentional or knowing 
killing) and b (intentional infliction of serious bodily injury) of second degree murder. Even 
if variants a and b are absent, the depraved indifference variant may still be present. 
Depraved indifference is the "least common denominator" or the minimum mens rea 
necessary to commit second degree murder. Any time either of the first two variations is 
present, the depraved indifference variation will also be present, because all three variations 
evidence at least depraved indifference. 
Therefore, when the trial judge concluded that the evidence did not support the 
depraved indifference variation of second degree murder, he also necessarily concluded that 
neither of the first two variants were supported by the evidence. Insufficient evidence on the 
depraved indifference variant meant that the evidence was also insufficient on the other two 
variants because each includes depraved indifference. Having concluded that the evidence 
did not support the depraved indifference murder, the trial court simply must have also 
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support either of the other two variations 
which are "forms of depraved indifference murder." State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 173-74 
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(Utah 1987) (Stewart, J. concurring). Its failure to do so was inconsistent with the case law 
presented to it from this Court. 
The State essentially claims that the trial court did not know the law concerning 
depraved indifference homicide. However, the trial court had at least Standiford (which 
clearly relies on Russell) before it when it considered the defense motion to dismiss the 
depraved indifference variant. (R. 177 at 335-36) The law of depraved indifference is 
clearly delineated in Standiford. Therefore, one must assume that the trial court did know 
the law and made its findings concerning depraved indifference based on insufficiency of the 
evidence. The court simply failed to extend its finding on depraved indifference to the other 
two variants of second degree murder. However, the fact remains that a factual finding with 
regard to the sufficiency of the evidence was made by the trial court and should be extended 
by this Court to the other two variants of second degree murder. 
POINT ffl 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE JURY SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO UNANIMOUSLY DECIDE WHICH 
VARIATION OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER WAS 
COMMITTED BY MS. GODDARD. 
In her opening brief Ms. Goddard argued that because the trial court found the 
evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict on the depraved indifference variant of second 
degree murder, the trial court should have granted the defense request to submit each of the 
remaining two variants of second degree murder on individual verdict forms. In response, 
the State argues that the case law in this jurisdiction states that second degree murder is 
merely one crime which may be committed in several ways and thus the defendant is not 
entitled to jury unanimity regarding the method of commission with respect to the mens rea. 
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In Russell this Court held that a jury does not have to be unanimous in deciding 
which of the three possible mental states is present to convict a defendant of second degree 
murder as long as the jurors all agree that at least one of the culpable mental states is 
present. The Russell conclusion is based on the fact that this Court held that the three 
variants of second degree murder are so closely related as to be one crime, a common 
denominator of depraved indifference being shared by all three variants. 
In this case the trial court undermined the holding of Russell by finding that depraved 
indifference was not common to the first two variants of second degree murder. If the trial 
court was correct in concluding that the evidence is insufficient to support the depraved 
indifference variant but sufficient to support either variant a or b, then this Court should 
reconsider the jury unanimity issue. If second degree murder is one crime that may be 
committed in three different ways, the insufficiency of the evidence with respect to the 
lowest common denominator, depraved indifference, should mean that the evidence was 
insufficient with respect to the other two methods also. See, e.g. Russell, 733 P.2d at 178 
(Durham, J. concurring). However, if as the trial court found, sufficient evidence may 
sustain a conviction on variant a or b but not on variant c, then the variants are apparently 
not as closely related as this Court indicated in Russell and, in fact, different crimes have 
been committed, not merely different variants of the same crime. Therefore, if different 
crimes are involved, Russell requires that a unanimity instruction be given to the jury. That 
was not done in this case. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT MS. 
GODDARD A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In her opening brief, Ms. Goddard argued that new evidence discovered after trial 
justified granting her motion for a new trial. The new evidence from a blood spatter expert 
refuted testimony by the medical examiner and validated Ms. Goddard's version of the event. 
Ms. Goddard argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant Ms. 
Goddard's request for a new trial. 
In response, the State argues that the evidence presented by Ms. Goddard, an affidavit 
from Dr. Judith Bunker, a nationally recognized blood spatter expert, did not qualify as 
newly discovered evidence because it was "merely cumulative" of testimony the jury had 
already considered. Brief of Appellee at 22-25. The State argues that Dr. Bunker's 
testimony was really only impeachment evidence "aimed at discrediting the testimony of Dr. 
Schnittker." Brief of Appellee at 24. 
Dr. Bunker's affidavit was newly discovered evidence which was not cumulative. 
This Court has stated that "newly discovered evidence should clarify a fact that was contested 
and resolved against the movant, or be sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial 
might be changed . . . ." State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988). Even though it 
argues that Dr. Bunker's affidavit was cumulative, the State admits that Dr. Bunker's 
affidavit would have added "a slightly different, non-dispositive slant to the evidence already 
before the jury." Brief of Appellee at 24. In effect, the State concedes that Dr. Bunker's 
affidavit would have served to "clarify a fact that was contested." Worthen, 765 P.2d at 
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851. In other words, the evidence was not cumulative. 
Dr. Bunker's affidavit did challenge Dr. Schnittker's credibility, but it also provided 
clarification of facts and issues which were contested during the trial. For example, Dr. 
Bunker's affidavit addressed the issue of whether Mr. Hall was standing when the fatal 
wound was inflicted, as the prosecution contended, or whether he was kneeling, as the 
defense contended. Dr. Bunker's evidence resolved the issue in favor of the defense. The 
evidence supported Ms. Goddard's version of the events and refuted the prosecution's 
version and, therefore, arguably would have influenced the result of the trial. 
During argument on the motion for a new trial, the prosecution conceded that Dr. 
Bunker's conclusions could be correct but claimed that those conclusions did not contradict 
the State's evidence presented at trial. (R. 181 at 9) That statement by the prosecutor is 
simply not accurate. For example, the prosecution stated that Dr. Bunker's conclusion that 
Mr. Hall was on his knees when the wound was inflicted was "not inconsistent with any of 
the testimony that Dr. Schnittker gave." (R. 181 at 9) However, the transcript of the trial 
revealed that Dr. Schnittker employed hypothetical situations during her testimony in which 
Mr. Hall was in a standing position when the fatal wound was inflicted. (R. 177 at 311, 
312) Schnittker's testimony on this point directly contradicted that of Ms. Goddard who 
testified that Mr. Hall was kneeling above her when the fatal wound was inflicted. (R. 177 
at 399) A logical deduction from Dr. Schnittker's testimony is that Mr. Hall was not above 
Ms. Goddard when the fatal wound was inflicted and therefore, Ms. Goddard stabbed Mr. 
Hall. This is contrary to Ms. Goddard's testimony that Mr. Hall was directly above a 
portion of her body and fell forward on the knife inflicting the fatal wound. (R. 177 at 399) 
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During rebuttal, however, Dr. Schnittker testified that this could not be the scenario when 
the wound was inflicted. (R. 178 at 485-87) Dr. Bunker concluded that because Mr. Hall 
was directly above the right arm rest of the rocker and Ms. Goddard was in the rocker when 
the fatal wound was inflicted, Mr. Hall was above Ms. Goddard when the wound was 
inflicted. This is contrary to Dr. Schnittker's testimony but supports Ms. Goddard's version 
of events. 
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by Dr. Bunker was not 
inconsistent with the trial testimony. However, in reaching this conclusion, the trial court 
failed to review the transcripts of the trial. Clearly, a comparison of the trial transcripts and 
Dr. Bunker's affidavit indicates that Dr. Bunker's affidavit supports the defense theory of the 
case and contradicts the prosecution's theory of the case. The evidence presented by Dr. 
Bunker's affidavit clarified a fact that was contested and resolved against Ms. Goddard. The 
evidence corroborated Ms. Goddard's version of events and, considering the source of the 
evidence, was probably sufficiently persuasive to have affected the result of the trial. 
Therefore, the newly discovered evidence presented by Dr. Bunker's affidavit was not 
merely cumulative nor merely impeachment evidence aimed at refuting Dr. Schnittker's 
testimony, although it clearly had that effect. Rather, Dr. Bunker's affidavit was truly newly 
discovered evidence which "clarified a fact that was contested and resolved against [Ms. 
Goddard]" and the evidence was "sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial might 
[have been] changed . . . ." Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851. 
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POINT V 
MS. GODDARD'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS PREJUDICED MS. 
GODDARD'S CASE. 
In her opening brief Ms. Goddard asserted that she was deprived of her right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Ms. Goddard contended that her trial counsel failed to 
investigate blood spatter evidence, failed to object to the medical examiner as an expert in 
blood spatter interpretation, and failed to object to the prosecutor's questioning of the 
defendant concerning other witnesses' motives to lie. Brief of Appellant at 33-42. 
In response, the State argues that in each alleged instance of ineffectiveness, the error 
did not meet the second prong of the Strickland standard which requires that the deficient 
performance of counsel adversely affect the outcome of the case. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984) In none of the three asserted instances of ineffectiveness, does the 
State address the issue of deficient performance. Therefore, the State apparently concedes 
that in each instance defense counsel's performance was deficient and therefore the first 
prong of Strickland was met. 
The first instance of ineffective assistance of counsel occurred when defense counsel 
failed to investigate circumstances surrounding the State's blood spatter evidence until after 
the conclusion of trial. In responding to this argument, the State relies primarily on the 
argument that the defendant's motion for a new trial, which was based on the blood spatter 
evidence presented in Dr. Bunker's affidavit, was denied by the trial court. The State 
concludes that the trial's outcome would not have been different had the blood spatter 
evidence been incorporated because the trial court concluded that the "newly discovered 
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evidence" was not sufficient to have effected the trial's outcome. Such reasoning by the 
State is circular and contradicts statements made by the prosecutor in the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial. In fact, the prosecutor argued that the blood spatter evidence was the 
type of evidence "that could have been discovered by the defendant with due diligence prior 
to trial." (R. 181 at 11) Clearly, the defense had conducted no investigation regarding 
blood spatter evidence prior to trial. 
In cases cited in the appellant's opening brief, this Court and the court of appeals 
have stated that the failure of trial counsel to initiate an investigation concerning a critical 
element of evidence during trial constitutes deficient, prejudicial performance by counsel. 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990); State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). In this case, defense counsel should have anticipated that the prosecution would 
present evidence concerning blood spatters found in the room where Mr. Hall was killed. 
Even after the prosecution's blood spatter evidence was presented, defense counsel made no 
effort to investigate the evidence or obtain an independent evaluation of the evidence. Dr. 
Bunker's testimony, procured only after trial, reflected directly upon the credibility of Dr. 
Schnittker and the credibility of Ms. Goddard. The affidavit of Dr. Bunker contradicted 
several aspects of Dr. Schnittker's testimony and supported several aspects of Ms. Goddard's 
testimony. Of all the prosecution witnesses, only Dr. Schnittker testified that Ms. Goddard's 
version of the events was "extremely unlikely" and contained "serious inconsistencies." Dr. 
Schnittker alone refuted Ms. Goddard's testimony and refused to alter her interpretation on 
cross-examination. Schnittker's unrefuted testimony was crucial to the State's case and 
counsel's failure to prepare to meet it and failure to investigate alternative interpretations of 
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the evidence prejudiced Ms. Goddard's case. 
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990), this Court held that evidence 
which should have been uncovered by an adequate investigation by defense counsel and 
which would have served to contradict important testimony presented by the prosecution 
affected the "entire evidentiary picture" of the trial and affected the outcome of the trial. In 
effect, this Court held that the deficient performance of counsel in failing to investigate the 
evidence was prejudicial to the defendant's case. Similarly, in this case, defense counsel's 
failure to procure a critical defense witness to testify at trial affected the "entire evidentiary 
picture" of the trial. Dr. Bunker's testimony which would have supported Ms. Goddard's 
version of events and contradicted Dr. Schnittker's version would quite likely have resulted 
in a more favorable result for Ms. Goddard. 
Ms. Goddard also asserted that her counsel was ineffective because she failed to 
challenge Dr. Schnittker's qualifications to testify regarding blood spatter evidence. In 
response, the State asserts that nothing in the record "would draw Dr. Schnittker's 
qualifications into question." Brief of Appellee at 27. Therefore, the State concludes that 
Ms. Goddard has failed to meet the second prong of the ineffectiveness test. 
As pointed out in appellant's opening brief, courts in other jurisdictions have 
recognized that blood spatter analysis is a specialty which is amenable to interpretation by 
those who are qualified in the field. The prejudice involved in counsel's failure to challenge 
Dr. Schnittker's testimony is amply illustrated by the fact that Dr. Bunker's affidavit refutes 
key areas of Dr. Schnittker's testimony. Clearly at the time of trial Dr. Schnittker was not 
qualified to testify as a blood spatter expert even though the prosecution used her as such and 
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defense counsel permitted the testimony. Critical to Dr. Schnittker's testimony was her 
interpretation that the blood spatters at the scene and on the clothing of both Ms. Goddard 
and Mr. Hall. This testimony was given despite the fact that Dr. Schnittker had apparently 
not personally examined the crime scene or the evidence prior to trial. (R. 142, R. 181 at 4) 
Had Dr. Schnittker not been allowed to testify as an expert in the area of blood spatter 
evidence, Dr. Schnittker would have been unable to expose and interpret what she considered 
to be the most compelling flaw in the defendant's testimony, i.e. that the shirt which the 
defendant was wearing did not have any blood spatters on the front of it. If Dr. Schnittker's 
blood spatter testimony is subtracted from the evidence, the entire evidentiary picture 
changes. No compelling reasons for disbelieving the defendant are offered by the 
prosecution. Therefore, a reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. Allowing Dr. Schnittker to testify as a blood spatter expert was 
therefore prejudicial to the defense case. 
Finally, Ms. Goddard contends that her trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 
failed to object to the prosecutor's repeated questioning of Ms. Goddard concerning the 
motivation of other witnesses to lie. The State concedes, as it must, that the questions 
propounded by the prosecution were improper. Brief of Appellee at 28, State v. Emmett. 
839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992). However, as in other arguments concerning ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the State contends that the deficient performance of counsel was not 
prejudicial to the outcome of the trial. The State argues that in one instance the prosecution 
elicited a response from the defendant which had the effect of impeaching a prior witness's 
credibility, and that in two other instances, "it is difficult to imagine" how responses from 
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the defendant prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Brief of Appellee at 28-29. 
Curiously, the State declares that testimony by Frank Gutierrez was impeached by 
Ms. Goddard's answer to the prosecutor's improper question. However, at another point in 
its brief, the State relies on the "impeached testimony" of Frank Gutierrez to support its 
argument that the evidence was sufficient to support Ms. Goddard's conviction. The State's 
argument demonstrates the prejudice inherent in the questions of the prosecutor. Clearly, the 
jury chose to believe Mr. Gutierrez over Ms. Goddard and therefore, contrary to the State's 
assertion, Ms. Goddard's testimony did not impeach that from Mr. Gutierrez. 
The questions of the prosecutor concerned the veracity of the testimony offered by 
Christine Grogan, Frank Gutierrez and Beth Steed. In each instance, the question 
propounded by the prosecutor concerned the veracity of the testimony of a witness on which 
the State, in its brief, relies onto establish that sufficient evidence supported Ms. Goddard's 
conviction. These witnesses provided evidence, as the State argues in its brief, which 
indicated Ms. Goddard's mental state prior to the homicide. By diminishing Ms. Goddard's 
credibility while at the same time bolstering the credibility of the other three witnesses, the 
prosecutor promoted his claim that the homicide was an intentional act by Ms. Goddard. 
Indeed, the State, in its brief, raises precisely the same argument. Had defense counsel 
interposed a timely objection at trial, Ms. Goddard's credibility would not have been 
diminished in the eyes of the jury. The questions asked by the prosecutor were clearly 
improper as the State now admits and counsel's deficient performance in failing to object to 
the questions prejudiced Ms. Goddard in the eyes of the jury. 
Both prongs of the Strickland standard have been met in all three instances of 
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deficient performance by counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the reasons presented in this brief and the opening brief of appellant, 
Defendant Teri Goddard respectfully requests that this Court reverse her conviction and 
remand the case for either a new trial or dismissal of the charge. 
Respectfully submitted this ?P day of April, 1993. 
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